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Abstract: In dealing with crises and conflicts, we often commit one of the fol-
lowing four errors of strategy: (1) the failure to use hard power when and where 
it is required; (2) the failure to use soft power when and where it is required; (3.) 
the use of hard power when and where a combination of hard and soft powers 
(smart power) is required; and (4) the use of soft power when and where smart 
power should be used. These errors of strategy have sometimes grave and disas-
trous consequences. This paper aims to prove that, in order to successfully 
prevent, resolve, manage or deal with crises and conflicts, we need to 
acknowledge that some of them require hard power, some require soft power, 
while others require both hard and soft powers (smart power). To contextualise 
the above hypothesis, employing case study and process tracing, the present paper 
addresses the ante-bellum period of the Nigeria Civil War. In the end, it will be 
indicated that the above-mentioned four errors of strategy led to war. If hard, soft 
and smart powers were used whenever and wherever they were required, the war 
could have been avoided. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper is divided into five sections. The first and fifth are in-
tended introduction and conclusions. In the second section, the key 
concepts will be clarified. It is very important to do so because they 
are the hinge around which the discussion revolves. In the third sec-
tion, I will narrate a brief history of the ante-bellum period of the 
Nigerian Civil War. Then, in the fourth section, I will explain the 
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erroneous strategies that led to the war. I chose this crisis/conflict 
precisely because many people believe that the war was unavoidable. 
General Yakubu Gowon, the Nigerian head of state at the time of 
this war, refers to it as “an unfortunate and unpleasant, yet unavoid-
able, occurrence in the history of Nigeria” (Gowon 2007, 10). While 
I totally agree with Gowon that the war was unfortunate and un-
pleasant, I totally disagree with him that it was unavoidable. As I will 
show below, the war was avoidable. It is a combination of the al-
ready mentioned four errors of strategy that led to it.  
 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Outlining the conceptual and theoretical framework is much more 
the staple of lengthy research papers than a paper like this one. Nev-
ertheless, I need to offer some important clarifications regarding the 
key concepts that I will use and the sort of analysis I will undertake. 
These key concepts have various connotations; hence it is vital to 
make clear their meanings. To understand what the power-concepts 
of hard power, soft power and smart power are, let us begin by ex-
plaining what power is. Power is “the ability to affect others to get 
the things you want. You can do that in three ways: you can use 
coercion, sticks; you can use payments, carrots; or you can use at-
traction and persuasion” (Nye 2011a, 46). Joseph Nye, in The Future 
of Power, introduced the distinction between hard power, soft power 
and smart power. For Nye, hard power has to do with “coercion 
and payment”, while soft power with “persuasion and attraction” 
(Nye 2011b, xiii). In hard power, “coercion” is largely seen as a mil-
itary force, while “payment” as economic resources. Hence, there 
are two kinds of hard power: military hard power and economic 
hard power. The first may be used as a threat of violence or, in actual 
violence, defensively or offensively, while the second in form of 
sanction or of an offer of favourable economic conditions or re-
sources.  
Soft power as attraction entails the other people in valuing or 
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cherishing what you are, what you have or what you represent, mak- 
ing them want to imitate you, join you, share in or benefit from what 
you are, what you have or what you represent. By doing so, they 
become amenable to you, so you can affect them to get what you 
want. Soft power as persuasion entails successfully convincing oth-
ers without using threat or payment, which is a better way to make 
them accept your arguments or advice. While “smart power is the 
combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the 
soft power of persuasion and attraction” (Nye 2011b, xiii), it also 
refers to “the ability to combine hard and soft power into (...) strat-
egies in varying contexts” (Nye 2011b, xiv). “A strategy relates 
means to ends, and that requires clarity about goals (preferred out-
comes), resources, and tactics for their use” (Nye 2011b, 208). 
Hence, smart power strategy “must be able to handle very different 
distributions of power in different domains and understand the 
trade-offs among them” (Nye 2011b, 213). Although there are mil-
itary hard power and economic hard power, in this paper I employ 
the term “hard power” only as military hard power, and I treat eco-
nomic hard power as soft power. Furthermore, the concepts of hard 
power, soft power and smart power are used in reference to foreign 
policy and security policies of states, in particular, and global poli-
tics, in general. I will use the concepts in reference to domestic 
policy, domestic politics, internal security policies and local strate-
gies.  
Regarding the Nigerian Civil War, my focus is not on the war 
itself; rather, on the causal factors of it. Of course, conflicts are man-
made phenomena; they are caused by human activities. I am dwell-
ing on the identification of different human activities that caused 
the war. There is no doubt that, in order to resolve or manage par-
ticular conflicts, it is imperative to know the causal factors and the 
multifaceted nature of the activities that caused them. The Nigerian 
civil war can be divided into three historical periods: ante-bellum, 
bellum and post-bellum. For the purpose of my analysis, by the bel- 
lum period I mean 6th July 1967 to 15th January 1970. The post-
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bellum period starts from 15th January, when the war ended. Alt- 
hough it shows the impact that the war had and continues to have 
in Nigeria, I will not focus on it. I am more preoccupied with how 
this war could have been avoided, rather than how it was fought. In 
other words, my main concern is prevention, rather than combat.  
The ante-bellum period ended on 15th January, when the war 
started. The beginning can be set as far back as 1914, when Nigeria 
came into being or might be limited to 1st October 1960, when Ni-
geria gained its independence. For the purpose of my analysis, I will 
consider its beginning on 15th January 1966, when the so-called 
five-majors-coup took place. I am settling this date because this 
event was the most prominent of all possible causes of the war. 
Since I am concerned with how the war could have been avoided, it 
is proper that I focus on the ante-bellum period, and for the purpose 
of my analysis, I will consider the ante-bellum period as it started on 
15th January 1966 and ended on 6th July 1967– a period of one year, 
five months and three weeks.  
For analytic, practical and moral reasons, I consider the war as a 
“bad thing” that ought to be avoided if it were possible. But I am 
not interested in how the war should have been avoided; rather, I am 
interested in how it could have been avoided. Furthermore, for ana-
lytic and moral reasons, I consider secession as a neutral, rather than 
a good or bad thing. For me, secession is what you make of it; it is 
bad when you make it bad, and good when you make it good. This 
does not mean that I am encouraging secession or I am saying that 
it might be good or bad, but that secession in itself is morally neu-
tral. For instance, if a people decides to secede in order to 
expropriate others from the collective national investment, wealth 
and development, which the entire country laboured to produce it, 
this is a bad thing. In the case of Biafra, it will be implausible to say 
that the secession was based on this ground. However, if a people 
have to secede in order to avoid pogrom, massacre, carnage, etc., 
surely this sort of secession must be a good thing. On this ground, 
we can say that the Biafran secession was morally justified. 
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3. THE ANTE-BELLUM PERIOD OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR  
 
From the beginning to the end of the ante-bellum period, the geo-
political structure of Nigeria was as follows. From 15th January 
1966 to 27th May 1967 there was the Northern Region (dominated 
by the Hausa/Fulani), the Eastern Region (dominated by the Igbo), 
the Western Region (dominated by the Yoruba), the Mid-West Re-
gion (a combination of minority ethnicities) and the Federal 
Territory of Lagos. On 27th May 1967, the Northern Region was 
divided into North-Eastern State, North-Western State, North Cen-
tral State, Benue-Plateau State, Kano State and Kwara State. The 
Eastern Region was divided into East-Central State, South-Eastern 
State and Rivers State. The Western Region (except the Colony 
Province) became the Western State. The Colony Province of the 
Western Region and the Federal Territory of Lagos became Lagos 
State, while the Mid-West Region was renamed Mid-West State. On 
30th May 1967, East-Central State, South-Eastern State and Rivers 
State - that is, the dissolved Eastern Region – seceded from Nigeria 
and were renamed The Republic of Biafra. This was the final event 
that led to the civil war. 
In the post-independence history of Nigeria (since 1st October 
1960), the civil war was the greatest catastrophe that has befallen. 
The war, which started on 6th July 1967 and effectively ended on 
12th January 1970, but officially ended on 15th January 1970, had 
both remote and immediate multifaceted causes. Many scholars and 
analysts often reduce its causal factors to ethnicity. This is tanta-
mount to reductionism because, although ethnicity was the principal 
causal factor, there were other factors too. Almost as important as 
ethnicity was the regional affiliation. Clearly, the Igbo were the main 
target in the Eastern Region, and they were its champions. But while 
the Eastern Region was predominantly Igbo, there were other eth-
nic groups in that region too. Moreover, during the ante-bellum 
period, the Northern Region, unlike the Eastern Region, did not 
present a particular ethnic group as the champion of the Northern 
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Region, and hence no particular ethnic group was the main target in 
this region. Reversely, no particular ethnic group was the target in 
the Northern Region, hence the region did not present any particu-
lar ethnic group as its champion. Regional, rather than ethnicity, was 
the main affiliation there.  
Some scholars and analysts erroneously give religion a prominent 
role in the causation of the war. But a proper analysis of the causes 
and fighting will show that religion had no consideration in this war. 
Although the Eastern Region was predominantly Christian and the 
Northern Region was predominantly Muslim, the principal actors 
on both sides were Christian: both Chukwuemeka Odumegwu 
Ojukwu and Yakubu Gowon were Christians. Furthermore, many 
key players on the Nigerian side were Christians; Benjamin Ad-
ekunle, Olusegun Obasanjo, Godwin Alabi-Isama, Theophilus 
Danjuma, Obafemi Awolowo, etc.  
Alongside ethnic and regional factors, the economic factor also 
played a crucial role. Since the war, petroleum has remained a factor 
in Nigerian conflicts. Oil played a strategic role in the fighting of the 
war. Although Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu - the leader of 
Biafra - was primarily fighting for the Igbo, he annexed the South-
Eastern State (non-Igbo) and Rivers States (Igbo and non-Igbo). 
One reason for this annexation might be because of the Igbo in 
Rivers State; but if so, then he would have also annexed Mid-West 
State because of the Igbo there. Another reason for the annexation 
was that South-Eastern State and Rivers State were part of the dis-
solved Eastern Region. Yet, a more plausible reason is that of 
strategy. Strategically, he needed to annex the two states for military 
and economic reasons. Militarily, firstly, he would have more people 
to fight for him in these places, while the federal government would 
consequently have less, and, secondly, these places would have been 
a buffer between the core Igbo state and Nigeria. It was for the same 
reasons that he forced the Mid-West State to be neutral in the early 
days of the war and even forced them to declare independence, 
which lasted one day.  
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The economic strategy for the annexation was simply because 
these states have oil; at least this is the most plausible economic rea-
son. In order to thwart the military and economic strategies 
mentioned above, when the strongest command of the Nigerian 
Army during the war (the Third Marine Commando commanded by 
Benjamin Adekunle, who was later replaced by Olusegun Obasanjo) 
invaded Biafra, the first task of the commandoes was to recapture 
these states for Nigeria. With the recapturing of the states, Nigeria 
did not only reduce the military and political strength of Biafra but 
also because of the oil Nigeria could fund the war, while Biafra 
could no longer fund it. This, to a large extent, contributed to Nige-
ria winning the war and Biafra losing it.  
Nevertheless, among the remote and immediate multifaceted 
causes of the war, the most important factors are: the January 1966 
coup; the July 1966 counter-coup; the pogrom before, during and 
after the counter-coup; the failure of Aburi Accord; and, finally, the 
secession of the Eastern Region, which was renamed The Republic 
of Biafra. The 1st October 1960 independence theoretically set Ni-
geria on a journey to greatness. Having been freed from the clutches 
of British colonialists, Nigerians felt they had ‘their destiny’ in their 
own hands and could go on to achieve greatness. But these beliefs 
and hopes of the average Nigerian were dashed by the political class, 
which was characterised by corruption, violence, electoral malprac-
tices and regionalist favouritism. Having been disenchanted with 
politicians, middle-ranked military officers attempted to overthrow 
the government, on 15th January 1966, in a failed coup d’état.  
On the one hand, most of the prominent leaders of the 15th Jan-
uary 1966 coup were Igbo. Among them: Majors Emmanuel Ifeajuna, 
Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, Timothy Onwuatuegwu, Christian 
Anuforo, Humphrey Chukwuka, Don Okafor, Captains Ben 
Gbulie, Emmanuel Nwobosi and Ogbu Oji. Moreover, many of the 
prominent persons who were killed during the coup were northern-
ers. Among them: Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Prime Minister), 
Ahmadu Bello (Premier of the Northern Region), Brigadier Zakar- 
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iya Maimalari (Brigade Commander, 2nd Brigade), Col. Kur Mo-
hammed (Chief of Staff, Army), Lt. Col. Abogo Lagerma 
(Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion), Lt. Col. James Pam (Adju-
tant-General, Army Headquarters), etc. When a northerner-prime 
minister, Tafawa Balewa, was killed, he was succeeded by an Igbo 
head of state, Major General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi. Due to the above 
facts, northerners saw the coup as an Igbo coup against the north. 
Consequently, northern military officers launched the 29th July 
1966 counter-coup, primarily against the Igbo. Aguiyi-Ironsi was as-
sassinated together with many Igbo officers. Although a northerner, 
Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, succeeded Aguiyi-Ironsi as the head of 
state, the northern vengeance against the Igbo did not stop after the 
counter-coup. Northern military officers engaged in massacring 
Igbo military officers, but also many non-Igbos from the Eastern 
Region. This escalated the pogrom against the Igbo, pogrom which 
already started in the north before the counter-coup. When thou-
sands of Igbo and other easterners continued to lose their lives, the 
rest of them had to seek refuge in their region, for they could no 
longer feel safe anywhere else. To curb the pogrom, soldiers were 
asked to return to their regions of origin. Furthermore, the governor 
of the predominantly Igbo region - Eastern Region – Lt. Col. 
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (an Igbo), called on easterners 
to leave other parts of Nigeria and return to the Eastern Region, 
while he ordered non-Easterners to leave the Eastern Region.  
On 4th-5th January 1967, in order to resolve the crisis, the dele-
gates of the Eastern Region, led by Ojukwu, and those of the federal 
government, led by Gowon met in Aburi, Ghana. At the end of the 
meeting, Ojuwku and Gowon signed the Aburi Accord. However, 
among the clauses of this accord, two of them turned out to be 
problematic. The first stated that federal legislative and executive 
powers should continue to reside in the Supreme Military Council, 
which was saddled with the responsibility of making decisions on all 
national matters. This clause had a provision which stated that when 
it is impossible for the Supreme Military Council to meet and decide 
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on national matters, such matters should be decided by the regional 
military governors. The other problematic clause stated that the 
country should revert to the Republican Constitution that existed 
before 15th January 1966 by repealing the decrees passed since 15th 
January 1966. In other words, the semi-autonomous status of the 
regions should be restored and power should be decentralized. 
Despite the Aburi Accord, the enmity between the two sides of 
the conflict continued. Gowon feared that Ojukwu was leading the 
Eastern Region to secession. In order to avoid the feared secession, 
Gowon declared, on 27th May 1967, a state of emergency, dissolved 
the existing four regions and created, in their stead, twelve states. 
The Eastern Region was split into three states, namely East-Central 
State, South-Eastern State and Rivers State. Notably, the Igbo were 
separated from the minority ethnic groups in the former Eastern 
Region. The new home of the Igbo became the East-Central State. 
While there were some Igbo in Rivers States and Mid-West State, 
they were by no means dominant there. It was only the East-Central 
State that the majority of Igbo could properly call home. 
In the struggle between Gowon and Ojukwu, Gowon’s dissolu-
tion of regions and the creation of states gave him three advantages, 
which were, in turn, Ojukwu’s disadvantages. First, the Igbo lost the 
support of the minority groups that used to be parts of the dissolved 
Eastern Region. Second, the petroleum resources that belonged to 
the dissolved Eastern Region became the property of South-Eastern 
State and Rivers State, where the Igbo did not have control. Thirdly, 
Ojukwu’s reign as governor of Eastern Region had come to an end 
since there was no more Eastern Region; hence Ojukwu was to lose 
his political power. Regarding the strategic dissolution of the exist-
ing four regions and the creation of twelve states, Gowon said: 
“even Decree No. 81 or Confederation or Loose Association will 
never survive if a section of the country is in the position to hold 
the others to ransom. This is why the item in the political and ad-
ministrative programme adopted by the Supreme Military Council 
last month is the creation of states as a basis for stability. This must 
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be done first so as to remove the fear of domination” (Vanguard 
2010).  
After realising his disadvantages and how the new development 
had breached the clauses of the Aburi Accord, Ojukwu stated the 
well-known phrase: “On Aburi we stand”. On 30th May 1967, he 
declared the secession of the entire former Eastern Region, which 
was renamed The Republic of Biafra. Three reasons for this seces-
sion can be plausibly deduced from the ante-bellum period. The 
main one - the protection of lives of the Igbo, in particular, and the 
lives of the people of the Eastern Region, in general. The second, 
closely related to the first, is the promotion of the interests of the 
Igbo, in particular, and the interests of the people from the Eastern 
Region, in general. The third reason, which is closely related to the 
second, is that given the petroleum resources in the Eastern Region, 
secession would mean that this resource would belong to the East-
ern Region alone, rather than entire Nigeria; hence Biafrans would 
have been better-off economically if they were to secede. Declaring 
the Republic of Biafra, Ojukwu said: 
 
(…) you, the people of Eastern Nigeria (…) aware that you can no longer be 
protected in your lives and in your property by any Government based outside 
eastern Nigeria; believing that you are born free and have certain inalienable 
rights which can best be preserved by yourselves; unwilling to be unfree part-
ners in any association of a political or economic nature; rejecting the 
authority of any person or persons other than the Military Government of 
Eastern Nigeria to make any imposition of whatever kind or nature upon you; 
determined to dissolve all political and other ties between you and the former 
Federal Republic of Nigeria; (…) having mandated me to proclaim, on your 
behalf and in your name, that Eastern Nigeria be a sovereign independent 
Republic. Now therefore I (…) do hereby solemnly proclaim that the territory 
and region known as and called Eastern Nigeria together with her continental 
shelf and territorial waters shall henceforth be an independent sovereign state 
of the name and title of The Republic of Biafra. And I do declare that all 
political ties between us and the Federal Republic of Nigeria are hereby totally 
dissolved (Siollun 2008a). 
 
In reaction to the secession, the federal government immediately 
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imposed economic blockades on Biafra in order to weaken its ability 
to successfully secede. A month and a week later, on 6th July 1967, 
the Nigerian Civil War officially started with the advancement of 
federal troops into Biafra. The Biafran soldiers surrendered, on 12th 
January 1967, and the war officially ended on 15th January 1970. An 
estimated one million civilians and one hundred thousand soldiers 
have lost their lives. There are many reasons for which we can say 
that the federal government did not acquiesce to the Eastern Re-
gion’s secession bid. These include the geographical reason, namely 
territorial integrity. In order to explain why he rejects the Eastern 
Region’s “insistence on its separate existence as a sovereign unit”, 
Gowon said: “the citizens of this country [Nigeria] have not given 
the Military Regime any mandate to divide up the country into sov-
ereign states and to plunge them into bloody disaster” (Vanguard 
2010).  
The problem with allowing a particular section of a country to 
secede is the fear of the domino effect, that the other parts might 
follow the model. Moreover, the domino effect might go beyond its 
borders. Here is a good proof in this regard: 
 
Britain was a key arms supplier to the federal government, enabling it to crush 
the rebellion because it believed that Biafran secession would create regional 
instability. The British (…) Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, agonised over 
this policy. ‘It would have been quite easy for me to say: this is going to be 
difficult - let's cut off all connexion with the Nigerian Government’, he says, 
now ‘If I'd done that I should have known that I was encouraging in Africa 
the principle of tribal secession - with all the misery that could bring to Africa 
in the future’ (qt. in Barnaby 2000).  
 
Moreover, in one of his speeches during the war, Ojukwu said that 
the Nigerian leaders “have also attempted to confuse the Africans 
and indeed world opinion by propagating the despicable falsehood 
that our independence would be a precedent for separation in other 
African states” (Ojukwu’s Speech 2010). 
Another reason for not acquiescing to secession is the fraternity. 
Since the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protec- 
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torates in 1914, Nigeria has been a “fraternal unit”. Although the 
easterners wanted to secede, the federal government felt that the 
fraternal unity was priceless. According to Gowon: 
 
(…) whilst it was commonplace for the media reports to refer to the crisis as 
a ‘Civil War’, we preferred to call it a rebellion, and to therefore term the 
action taken to deal with it as ‘Police Action/Military Action’, not war. These 
terms were deliberately used because I believed that the term ‘war’ promoted 
the image of a battle between two hostile enemies. I did not consider the 
Eastern Region and the Igbos an enemy, but rather a misled area. Further-
more, the war would have entailed the excessive use of force and justify 
unethical behaviour and action that, in my opinion, was unacceptable (Gowon 
2007, 13). 
 
Gowon’s sense of fraternity and unity was reflected, at the end of 
the war, in the ideas of “no victor, no vanquished” and “no medals 
for the federal soldiers” in order to foster reconciliation and reinte-
gration. It the official declaration at the end of the war, Gowon said: 
 
On our side, we fought the war with great caution, not in anger or hatred, but 
always in the hope that common sense would prevail. Many times we sought 
a negotiated settlement, not out of weakness, but in order to minimize the 
problems of reintegration, reconciliation and reconstruction. We knew that 
however the war ended, in the battlefield, or in the conference room, our 
brothers fighting under other colours must rejoin us and that we must to-
gether rebuild the nation anew (Siollun 2008b). 
 
Other reasons for not acquiescing to secession are economic and 
political. On the economic reason, the vast petroleum resources in 
the Eastern Region would have made Nigeria a more viable econ-
omy. On the political reason, a balkanized Nigeria is a weaker 
Nigeria, while a non-balkanized Nigeria is a stronger one. In this 
regard, Gowon said: 
 
The world knows how hard we strove to avoid the civil war. Our objectives 
in fighting the war to crush Ojukwu’s rebellion were always clear. We desired 
to preserve the territorial integrity and unity of Nigeria. For, as one country, 
we would be able to maintain lasting peace amongst our various communities; 
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achieve rapid economic development to improve a lot of our people; guaran-
tee a dignified future and respect in the world for our prosperity and 
contribute to African unity and modernization. On the other hand, the small 
successor states in a disintegrated Nigeria would be victims of perpetual war 
and misery and neo-colonialism (Siollun 2008b). 
 
 
4. ERRONEOUS STRATEGIES 
 
The war failed to be avoided because of a combination of strategy 
errors made by the principal actors during the ante-bellum period. 
Firstly, hard power was used when and where soft power was re-
quired. Secondly, soft power was used when and where hard power 
was required. Thirdly, hard power alone was used when and where 
a combination of hard power and soft power (smart power) was 
required. Finally, soft power alone was used when and where a com-
bination of soft power and hard power (smart power) was required. 
In considering these errors of strategy, I will focus on the principal 
actors of the ante-bellum period, since their actions and omissions 
were of utmost importance to the country. I am not necessarily iso-
lating the principal actors as individuals; I see them both as 
individuals and representatives of the various collaborators with 
whom they acted or failed to act, and the various constituencies they 
represented. The various errors of strategy are as follows. 
The leaders of the coup from January 1966 believed that they 
could bring the revolution they wanted only through hard power. 
According to Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, “the aim of the 
Revolutionary Council is to establish a strong united and prosperous 
nation, free from corruption and internal strife. Our method of 
achieving this is strictly military” (Siollun 2008c). This extreme reli-
ance on military hard power did not result only in the July 1966 
counter-coup and the subsequent crisis, which culminated in seces-
sion and civil war. It also produced a domino effect that established 
a coup culture and military rule in Nigeria until 29th May 1999. 
The leaders of July 1966 counter-coup believed that the only way 
in which they could get the ‘justice’ they wanted for the slain north- 
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ern political and military leaders, the change of leadership of the 
country and the secession of the northern region was through hard 
power. 
Aguiyi-Ironsi’s failure to ‘adequately’ punish the January 1966 
coup leaders and Gowon’s total failure to punish the July 1966 
counter-coup leaders can be considered to be grave strategic failures 
of relying on soft power when hard power should have been relied 
on. Aguiyi-Ironsi was seen as being too ‘soft’, rather than ‘hard’, by 
the January 1966 coup leaders. This fact contributed to northern 
military officers’ quest for ‘justice’ or vengeance, which resulted in 
the July 1966 counter-coup. To what extent Aguiyi-Ironsi should 
have used hard power to adequately punish the coup leaders is dif-
ficult to tell. But he already used hard power to successfully check 
the coup leaders and arrest most of them, prosecuting and ade-
quately punishing them. On his part, Gowon’s placating and 
pacifying the July 1966 counter-coup leaders rather than punishing 
them contributed to the Igbo (in particular) and the easterners (in 
general) deciding they were no longer safe anywhere in the country 
except in their own region. It was this grounded feeling of insecurity 
that, one year later, lead to secession and, subsequently, to war.  
Aguiyi-Ironsi did not use military power to stop northerners 
from massacring the Igbo, in particular, and killing easterners, in 
general. Here, Aguiyi-Ironsi needed to act urgently; he should have 
immediately used hard power to stop the massacre, and then employ 
soft power to pacify, reconcile and reintegrate both sides of the con-
flict. Gowon too did not use hard power to stop the northern 
soldiers who were massacring Igbo soldiers, in particular, and killing 
soldiers from the eastern region, in general. Furthermore, Gowon 
did not use military force to stop northern civilians from massacring 
Igbo civilians, in particular, and killing eastern civilians, in general. 
Like Aguiyi-Ironsi, Gowon erroneously relied on soft power alone 
and failed to use hard power when and where he should have used 
it.  
Aguiyi-Ironsi opted for extreme pacifism and persuasion to the 
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extent that although the country was very volatile, he failed to em-
ploy military power to quell the ongoing unrest and prevent the 
imminent violence that was almost certain to happen. He only relied 
on ‘soft’ consultations and persuasions. He went on a nationwide 
tour to seek the support of leaders in the different regions (especially 
traditional rulers) in pacifying and persuading their people to shelf 
violence. It was on that tour that he too was assassinated. While 
engaging on pacifism and persuasion, Aguiyi-Ironsi should have at 
least put the security threat level on ‘red’, and hence put his hard 
power on alert since he knew the country was facing a severe secu-
rity risk.  
Like Aguiyi-Ironsi, Gowon extremely relied on soft power and 
failed to use hard power when he should have used it to prevent an 
imminent civil war. In essence, he failed to combine hard power 
with soft power, in other words, he failed to use smart power when 
it was required. Dissolving the existing four regions and creating 
twelve states in order to avoid secession, Gowon said: 
 
Nigeria has been immersed in an extremely grave crisis for almost eighteen 
months. We have now reached a most critical phase where what is at stake is 
the very survival of Nigeria as one political and economic unit (…). The whole 
world is witness to the continued defiance of federal authority by the Gov-
ernment of the Eastern Region (…). The consequence of these illegal sets has 
been the increasing deterioration of the Nigerian economy. It has also pro-
duced uncertainty and insecurity and pushed the country with increasing 
tempo towards total disintegration and possible civil war and bloodshed on a 
massive scale. In the face of all these, I have shown great restraint, hoping 
that through peaceful negotiations a solution acceptable to all sections of the 
country can be found. Unfortunately, the hopes of myself and my other col-
leagues on the Supreme Military Council have been disappointed (Vanguard 
2010).  
 
While engaging on pacifism and persuasion, Gowon too should 
have at least put the security threat level on ‘red’, and hence put his 
hard power on alert since he knew the country was facing severe 
security risks. Gowon believed that persuasion would work; hence 
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the Aburi meeting which led to the Aburi Accord. Gowon would 
later agree that persuasion failed. Referring to the failure of persua-
sion, Gowon said:  
 
(…) but what has been the response of the Eastern Region Government? 
Complete rejection of Decree No. 8 and insistence on its separate existence 
as a sovereign unit (…). The response of the east has been completely negative 
and they have continued their propaganda and stage-managed demonstrations 
for ‘independence’ (…). Even Decree No. 8 or Confederation or Loose As-
sociation will never survive if any one section of the country is in a position 
to hold the others to ransom (Vanguard 2010). 
 
Gowon believed that the “appeasement” of Ojukwu and the eastern 
region could work.  
 
I have spared no effort to conciliate the East in recognition of their under-
standable grievances and fears since the tragic incidents of 1966. To this end, 
I agreed with my other colleagues on the Supreme Military Council to the 
promulgation of the Decree No. 8 which completely decentralized the gov-
ernment of this country and even went further than the Republican 
Constitution as it existed before 15th January 1966 (Vanguard 2010).  
 
But Gowon later agreed that the appeasement failed. Referring to 
the failure of the appeasement of Ojukwu, he said: 
 
Lt. Col. Ojukwu has continuously increased his demands as soon as some are 
met in order to perpetuate the crisis and lead the Eastern Region out of Ni-
geria. We know very well the tragic consequences of such a misguided step. 
Not only will the regions themselves disintegrate further, but before then, 
pushed by foreign powers and mercenaries who will interfere, this dear coun-
try will be turned into a bloody stage for chaotic and wasteful civil war 
(Vanguard 2010). 
 
Even when he used hard power, Gowon was extremely cautious to 
the extent that rather than using military action to prevent the se-
cession, he opted for, and attempted to use police action. It was only 
when his first and preferred option failed that he opted to use mili- 
tary action. He said: “a breakup of the country was imminent and 
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needed to be prevented. Police Action was taken but the defiance 
escalated and was insufficient to stop the drift towards secession. 
[Then] a full military action was ordered” (Gowon 2007, 12). Nev-
ertheless, to his credit, Gowon was conscious of the fact that in 
trying to prevent a civil war like the Nigerian one, the problem with 
using excessive hard power is that even if it succeeds to prevent the 
war, it will still be counter-productive later on. Using too much hard 
power, even if it succeeds in preventing the secession, may make the 
Igbo resentful of Nigeria. If the Igbo’s resentment of Nigeria is a 
continuous one, then this raises questions of domination and legiti-
macy. Continuously forcing a people to be under you against their 
will can be argued to be tantamount to domination and hence the 
question of legitimacy will becloud the achieved ‘forced unity.’  
During the January 1966 coup, Ojukwu relied on hard power to 
contribute to stopping the coup leaders from taking over the coun-
try. After the coup, during the subsequent crisis that ensued, 
Ojukwu initially relied on soft power – as evidenced by the Aburi 
meeting. But he later resorted to hard power to get the secession of 
the Eastern Region. Firstly, when he needed to use hard power, dur-
ing the January 1966 coup, he did. Secondly, when he needed to use 
soft power during the subsequent crisis which ensued after the 
coup, he did. However, thirdly, when he totally jettisoned soft 
power and absolutely relied on hard power in order to guarantee the 
secession of the Eastern Region, he fell into an error of strategy. 
During the Aburi meeting, he wanted a clause to be included in the 
accord, which was to allow regions to secede if they wish to do so. 
But the clause was rejected by the representatives of the federal gov-
ernment. Nevertheless, the war became inevitable the moment he 
decided to totally jettison soft power and absolutely rely on hard 
power. Ojukwu over-relied on hard power and then got his strategy 
wrong. Perhaps it was Gowon’s reputation for over-reliance on soft 
power that led Ojukwu to wrongly believe that he could use hard 
power to intimidate the former. As Gowon says, “during the crisis, 
my colleague and brother, Emeka Ojukwu, said: ‘We know Gen. 
Frank Abumere – Consequences of Erroneous Strategies 
 
 
 
64 
Gowon, he is a Christian and he would not like to fight. Do you 
know the first thing he puts in his suitcase? His Bible; and that will 
make him not to engage in a fight’. I think, unfortunately, he was 
proved wrong. As a Christian soldier, it was my duty to keep my 
country together” (Punch 2015).  
In short, it is not that Ojukwu, the January 1966 coup leaders 
and the July 1966 counter-coup leaders should have totally rejected 
hard power and absolutely opted for soft power. Also, it is not that 
Aguiyi-Ironsi and Gowon should have totally rejected soft power 
and absolutely opted for hard power. Soft power, as well as hard 
power, might work extremely well or might not work at all. Some 
contexts require soft power just as some other require hard power. 
But, there are situations that require smart power. Given that smart 
power contains the resources of both soft and hard powers, it has 
the best chance of success and, hence, it is the best possible option. 
In an economic analogy, soft power and hard powers can be seen 
as mono-product economies, while smart power as a diversified 
economy. Just as a diversified economy, rather than a mono-prod-
uct economy - or an almost mono-product economy - is a safer way 
to produce economic growth, in particular, and economic develop-
ment, in general, so smart power is preferable to soft power on the 
one hand, and hard power, on the other. Nevertheless, there are 
contexts that require only hard power or soft power, just as there 
are contexts that require smart power. 
The problem is not that Ojukwu, the January 1966 coup leaders 
and the July 1966 counter-coup leaders relied on hard power, nor 
that Aguiyi-Ironsi and Gowon relied on soft power. Rather, it is that 
the January 1966 and the July 1966 coup leaders exclusively relied 
on hard power to the extent that they totally rejected or, at least had 
no consideration, for soft power in their strategy. Similarly, the 
problem is that Aguiyi-Ironsi and Gowon over-relied on soft power 
and neglected hard power to the detriment of their strategies. Also, 
in the end, Ojukwu over-relied on hard power and jettisoned soft 
power. Ironically, the January 1966 coup leaders, especially 
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Nzeogwu - the most popular of them - used the soft power of ide-
ology to recruit soldiers for the coup. But they totally abandoned 
soft power when they planned and executed their revolution. Simi-
larly, it was the soft power of regional affiliation that united 
northerners, and it was based on this regional affiliation that the 
northern coup leaders of the July 1966 counter-coup sought to seek 
‘justice’ for fellow northerners. But they threw soft power out of the 
window when they embarked on their mission to seek ‘justice.’ Also, 
ironically, it was hard power that Aguiyi-Ironsi used to successfully 
check the January 1966 coup. But after this, he jettisoned hard 
power, just as it was soft power that took Ojukwu to Aburi. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The foregoing discussion shows that the Nigerian Civil War failed 
to be avoided because of four errors of strategy. In other words, if 
hard power, soft power and smart power were used whenever and 
wherever they were required, the war could have been avoided. To 
resolve, manage or deal with cases such as the ante-bellum period 
of the Nigerian civil war, we need strategies that are at once balanced 
and flexible. On the one hand, by balanced strategy I mean a strategy 
that neither only considers hard power and discounts soft power, 
nor only consider soft power and discounts hard power. Rather, it 
contains both - smart power. On the other hand, by flexible strategy 
I mean a strategy that is not only suitable for crises and conflicts 
that require hard power or soft power but is at once suitable for 
crises and conflicts that require hard power or soft power or smart 
power (Abumere 2015, 7-8). As Nye says, “an approach too rigid to 
strategy can be counterproductive” (Nye 2011b, 212). The three 
merits of a balanced and flexible strategy are: it has hard power to 
deal with crises and conflicts when and where hard power is re-
quired; it has soft power to deal with crises and conflicts when and 
where soft power is required; and it has smart power – that is, it can 
Frank Abumere – Consequences of Erroneous Strategies 
 
 
 
66 
combine both hard power and soft power in order to deal with cri-
ses and conflicts (Abumere 2015, 7-8). Hence it eliminates, or at 
least reduces, the frequency of occurrence of these four errors of 
strategy. 
Nye aptly asserts that “power always depends on context” (Nye 
2011b, xiv). In view of the above assertion, using hard power in a 
context that requires soft power will be counterproductive or, at 
least, will lead to failure; and using soft power in a context that re-
quires will have the same negative result (Abumere 2015, 7-8). In 
other words, hard power is useless in a context that requires soft 
power, and soft power is useless in a context that requires hard 
power. “In the relationship between strategy and crisis or conflict, 
the nature of the crisis or conflict should determine the nature of 
the strategy that is formulated and implemented to deal with them” 
(Abumere 2015, 7-8). In order to know when and where to use hard 
power, soft power or smart power, we should ask the following 
questions: (i) “what goals or outcomes are preferred?”; (ii) “what 
resources are available and in which contexts”; (iii) “what the posi-
tions and preferences of the targets of influence attempts are?”; (iv) 
“which forms of power behaviour are most likely to succeed?”; (v) 
“what the probability of success is?” (Nye 2011b, 208-209). De-
pending on the answers to these five questions we will know 
whether we should rely on only hard power, only soft power, or we 
should use smart power.  
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Notes 
1. In essence, this decree has constitutionally restored the confederation.
